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Introduction
Suppose you are an inventor and you want to be able to prove you had a certain in-
genious idea before anyone else. However, you do not want to reveal what the idea
is. You thus just want your documents to be tied to the time they were created,
possibly without revealing the contents of the documents themselves. This is the
problem of time-stamping. Simple forms of time-stamping have been around for
hundreds of years via the notary and patent offices and even the postal service has
been used to this effect, but in the current age of electronic communication such
archaic methods may often be too slow. Cryptographic time-stamping schemes
can be used to remedy that situation.
However, constructing a scheme that is reliable but also secure against forgeries is
by no means a trivial matter. Many of the models originally discussed have turned
out to be insecure under the original assumptions. This does not mean they are
insecure but means that their security cannot be proven in the way originally
thought plausible and that either stronger or different assumptions are needed.
One of the best known examples is the unbounded hash tree based approach of
Harber and Stornetta that was later analyzed by Saarepera and Buldas.
This thesis concentrates on the impossibility of constructing a secure hash func-
tion for the unbounded time-stamping scheme Saarepera and Buldas proposed
from collision-resistant hash functions. Impossibility results of this type are usu-
ally proved via so called oracle separation methods by showing that given use of
a certain oracle, one of the primitives exists and the other doesn’t. We mainly
concern ourselves with studying the properties of one candidate for such an oracle
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– one that constructs a large hash tree and then uses that to give time-stamping
certificates. We study the possibilities of exploiting this oracle to find collisions
for hash functions and show that constructing an adversary that could actually do
that is quite complicated.
The first chapter gives a gentle introduction into the unbounded time stamping
scheme described by Harber and Stornetta and shows the origins of the problem.
The second chapter is mainly dedicated to cryptographic reductions and meth-
ods of proving that none can exist between two primitives. The third chapter is
composed of original results that study the properties of the proposed hash tree
oracle and show that the simplest possible approach the adversary could take can
be foiled by a cleverly constructed oracle. The fourth chapter discusses some other
approaches that can be ruled out in a similar manner and then goes on to discuss
other possible constructions for separation oracles.
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1. Unbounded Timestamping
1.1 Timestamping Introduction
Suppose you are an inventor and you just had a brilliant idea. You want to protect
yourself against someone later claiming to have had that same idea, but earlier. If
he honestly claims so, there is relatively little you can and should be able to do.
To avoid a dishonest claim of this type, it would be sufficient if you could securely
tie your idea to the date and possibly time at which you discovered it. This is the
problem of timestamping.
One simple model would be to have a trusted central authority that recieves the
idea, appends a timestamp to it in a standard way and then signs it. Assuming
that the signature scheme is secure and the central authority is always trustworthy,
this is a good model and it has been used in paperwork for hundreds of years –
notary and patent offices essentially fill this role.
Assume however that the inventor does not want to trust a central authority with
his idea. Over the years, many rather ingenious things have been done to the
effect of timestamping. The most common of them involved paranoid inventors
sending the documents describing the invention to themselves in a sealed envelope.
The postal timestamp could later be used in court, assuming the envelope was left
sealed until that time.
The digital version of that scheme would be to send a hash value computed using
a publicly known hash function of your invention to the central authority instead
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of the plaintext document. Assuming that the hash function is hard to reverse,
this trusts relatively little information about your actual work into the hands of
the authority. When the timestamp needs to be verified, the document can be
presented and people can check that the signature is indeed given to the hash
value corresponding to it.
This scheme is not without its problems. The main one is that it is rather easy for
the authority to issue backdated timestamps, so it may be possible for someone
to get a timestamp to their document that claims he had the results earlier, when
he didn’t. We would like to make it hard for even the central authority itself to
forge timestamps. This can indeed be achieved and many different models have
been built that do so.
This thesis works with the model proposed by Harber and Stornetta in [6]. The
the security of this model was extensively scrutinized by Buldas and Saarepera in
[4] and it was shown that collision-resistance, one of the most common properties
expected from a hash function does not imply that it is secure for that scheme. The
main aim of this thesis is to explore the possibility that no constructions of secure
hash functions for this scheme could be made from collision resistant functions.
Before going into the details of security, we first explain the scheme itself.
1.2 The Scheme of Harber and Stornetta
1.2.1 Parties Involved
The scheme of Harber and Stornetta involves three parties: a Client C, a Server
S and a repository R and gives two procedures – one for creating a timestamp
and one for verifying it. It is assumed that R is write-only so once something is
commited to it, it cannot be changed. This can be accomplished in practice by
publishing the value in a widely available medium so many different and unaffil-
iated parties can mirror it (a quote from Linus Torvalds: ”Only wimps use tape
backup: real men just upload their important stuff on ftp, and let the rest of the
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world mirror it”). The server is in the role of a ”trusted authority” but is severely
more restricted than in the naive notary or postal stamp models described in the
previous section.
The scheme uses two hash functions hc : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k (that is, a function from
a bitstring of any length to one of length k) and hs : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k. The
function hc is the function used by the clients to get hash values from original
documents. The other, hs is the server side function which is used for computing
the published hash value.
1.2.2 Hash Circuits
In this work we are mainly concerned with the properties of the server-side function
hs. We note that it is defined to be from 2k length bitstrings to k length bit
stings. We can therefore model hs as a function with two inputs of length k and
with one output of the same length. This allows us to write hs(x1, x2) = y where
x1, x2, y ∈ {0, 1}k. We can also model them as circuit elements (or ”gates”) where
we assume that each ”wire” carries k bits simultaneously (see fig. 1.1).
y
x1 x2
hs
Figure 1.1: Diagram for hs(x1, x2) = y.
Since the output is of the same length as the inputs, we can use the output of one of
these elements as an input for another one. This allows us to build trees of the hs
gate, taking many different inputs x1, . . . , xm but giving only one single output rt.
There are many ways of constructing a tree given a fixed number of inputs (see fig.
1.2 for two example trees for four inputs - the first depicts hs(hs(x1, x2), hs(x3, x4))
and the second is for hs(hs(hs(x2, x4), x1), x3)). From now on we call such trees
composed of hash functions either hash trees, hash circuits or Merkle trees in
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honour of Ralph Merkle who invented them in 1980 [10]. We call the value r
returned at the bottom of the tree its root value.
hs
x1 x2 x3 x4
hs
hs
r
x3
x1
x4x2
hs
hs
hs
r
Figure 1.2: Examples of hash trees with 4 inputs.
1.2.3 Time-stamping Procedure
Time-stamping procedure is divided into rounds of equal duration. During each
round, the server S waits for hash values of length k assumably formed by hc to
be sent to it by the clients C. At the end of the round t, it takes all the values
x1, . . . , xm ∈ {0, 1}k sent to it by the clients and then builds a hash circuit out
of them. It then calculates the root value rt. How the binary tree is constructed
is chosen by the server S and is by the initial scheme not restricted in any way,
assuming that all inputs sent to S are used in it. For example, both trees from
fig. 1.2 could be used in case of four inputs. This is why the scheme is called
unbounded.
The server then publishes the value rt into the repository R and starts sending out
certificates to the clients. The certificate itself is an ordered 4-tuple c = (x, t, n, z)
where x is the value being certified, t is the number of the round that just ended,
n = n1n2 . . . nl, ni ∈ {0, 1} describes the path from x down to the root and
z = (z1, . . . , zl) ∈ ({0, 1}k)l gives the information to verify that path.
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Figure 1.3: A larger tree with a path marked from x4.
We give a small example by describing the certificate of x4 in fig. 1.3. The sequence
n encodes the structure of the path starting from the original value x4 downwards
while the sequence z gives the other inputs used alongside x4 and values calculated
from that. As x4 is the left input for the first box, n1 = 1 and we take z1 to be
the other input into that box (which in this case is hs(x5, x6)). We now move to
the second box on the path and see that the output of the previous box is now the
right input. We thus set n2 = 0 to signify that and then take z2 to be the second
input into this box (which in this case is hs(x1, hs(x2, x3))). The third and final
element on the path has the second one as the left input again so we set n3 = 1 and
take z3 to be the other input again. Since there are no more boxes, the certificate
for x4 for the tree given in fig. 1.3 is c = (x4, t, 101, (z1, z2, z3)).
1.2.4 The Verification Procedure
The verification procedure can be carried out by C based on his original document
D and the certificate c = (x, t, n, z) issued for it. The first step is to check that the
x in the certificate indeed matches the hash value hc(D) of the original document.
The calculation then proceeds by defining y1 := x and then inductively calculating
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the sequence y2, . . . , yl+1 based on the formula
yi+1 :=
 hs(zi, yi) ni = 0hs(yi, zi) ni = 1 . (1.1)
Once it has the value yl+1 it queries the repository R for the value rt and checks
whether rt = yl+1. We refer the reader back to fig. 1.3 for an illustration of z and
y values in the circuit.
For notational convenience we define the verifier function V (x, n, z) := yl+1. Then
the last paragraph describes how to check whether V (x, n, z) = rt.
Essentially, a certificate for x thus consists of the path that leads from x down to
the root, where n specifies which direction the path turns to and z gives all the
other values used in that path alongside yi.
1.3 Security of the scheme
1.3.1 Introduction to Cryptology
Cryptology is the science of secure communication in the widest sense. It has roots
dating back to antiquity but arose in its modern form only in the last century. The
main goal of modern cryptology is to construct communication schemes that are
secure relative to certain possible attacks.
We bring a small example from the time-stamping scenario described above. Sup-
pose there is a malicious adversary that intercepts the value of hc(D) as it is
transmitted from client C to server S. Suppose that this adversary is somehow
capable of deducing vital details about D from that value. This would be consid-
ered an attack. If C wants to be secure against this type of attack, he has two
options – use a secure channel that cannot be eavesdropped or use a hash function
hc that does not reveal any useful information about D from hc(D). The second
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would be considered a security property of that hc.
Cryptology research can be divided into two broad categories. The first one is
trying to construct certain secure primitives such as functions that are hard to re-
verse like we would have needed in the previous example. The second tries to use
these primitives in more complicated schemes such as the time-stamping scheme
described in the previous section and to prove the security of these schemes on the
assumption of the security of the primitives.
The main problem of applied cryptology is that practically no provably secure
primitives actually exist. The security of most of them rests on different types
of assumptions (large integers being hard to factor, discrete logarithm problem
being hard for certain groups, P 6= NP). Also, given infinite amount of time, most
primitives can easily be shown to be breakable. Therefore the notion of security
is usually defined in terms of a bounded time adversary being able to gain only a
mariginal advantage. We now present a concrete example of that paradigm which
we can use to explain what we mean exactly.
1.3.2 Understanding Cryptographic Security
We first define the notion of a collision that is central in the presentation of this
thesis:
Definition 1.3.1. We say that the pair x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n form a collision for
h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m if x1 6= x2 and h(x1) = h(x2).
We now bring a textbook security property definition and then try to describe
what is meant by it in simpler terms.
Definition 1.3.2. We say that a family χ of hash functions h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
(n > m) is (t, )-collision resistant if for any t-time adversary A we have
Pr[h← χ, (m0,m1)← A(h) : m0 6= m1, h(m0) = h(m1)] <  . (1.2)
We first start by specifying what is a t-time adversary. By an adversary we usually
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mean an algorithm (a computer program) that is given certain input and produces
a certain output corresponding to that input which has some sort of undesirable
properties. In our example, the adversary A is given as input the description of
h and is expected to output a pair of values (m0,m1) (which is described in the
definition by (m0,m1) ← A(h)). We call an adversary program t-time adversary
if it makes at most t steps in its execution before producing an output in some
computational model. What that model is, does not usually concern us, so it can
be a Turing machine, a random access machine or any other reasonable model of
that type. It could also be a human being who is given exact instructions on what
to do (so he cannot use his creativity) and has at most t minutes of time before
he is required to produce an output. By the Church-Turing thesis all such models
are equal and although some are faster and some are slower, we are usually not
concerned about the specific implementation. Therefore one model is usually just
fixed, Turing machine being the most common choice for that.
However, the adversary does not even have to be wholy deterministic and in fact
is often considered to have access to an infinite supply of random cointoss results
on which to base his random descisions. In essence a t-time adversary is thus
an adversary (a computer program or a non-creative human being) that has only
a limited amount of time t before an output is expected from it and that works
according to fixed rules, but may use randomness in his descisions. Due to the fact
that the algorithm might be randomized, its output is not one specific value but
rather chosen from a certain distribution based on the randomness distribution
given to it.
The equation 1.2 can be stated in words: ”The probability that after randomly
choosing a h from χ the two values m1 and m2 returned by the adversary A with
input h are different but h(m1) = h(m2) is less than ”. We call such a pair of
(m1,m2) a collision and if the adversary has a low chance of finding one for this
family of hash functions χ we call the family collision resistant.
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There are several reasons that security is defined like it is:
Firstly, we define collision resistance on a family of hash functions because for
every single function there exists an adversary that finds a collision: since there
are more possible input values (2n) than output values (2m), there has to be at
least one such pair (m1,m2) and we can take an adversary that doesn’t even look
at the input and just blindly returns this pair. It is guaranteed to find a collision
for the fixed h (although it fails to find a collision for most of the others).
Secondly, we bound the time the adversary is allowed to work because if we did
not, it could just try all the possible pairs until one fit and then return it. This
would, however, take at least roughly 2n · 2n = 22n steps so if we choose t to be a
lot smaller (say n or n2), that tactic would not lead to a good chance of finding a
collision.
Thirdly, we use  instead of 0 because the latter is infeasible – since we know that
given infinite time, we can always find a collision, it is only rational (and can in
fact be proven) that the adversary does gain a small advantage even if it only
works for a short time (and as the time bound increases, so does the advantage).
This is the basic model the security properties of the primitives are defined in -
we have a time-bounded adversary that is allowed to gain a small advantage (just
as long as it is small). The security of the schemes is usually defined for roughly
the same model. We now go on to investigate the security of the Harber-Stornetta
scheme.
1.3.3 The Actual Security of Harber-Stornetta Scheme
The original authors considered security against the attack where the bounded
time adversary is allowed to commit hash values x1, . . . , xn to timestamping, re-
ceives their certificates from the server and the root value from the repository. He
is then expected to produce x that is different from x1, . . . , xn and a certificate for
it that would be valid for the original period.
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This is a very strong security claim, which means that no value x could possibly
be backdated at a later time with a reasonable probability. The original paper
postulated that the scheme is secure in that respect if hs was chosen to be collision
resistant. The curious reader may start to wonder what collision resistance could
possibly have to do with the security of this type of scheme against this type of
attack.
The scheme was critically revised by Buldas and Saarepera in [4]. They noted that
the scheme is in fact insecure against the described type of attack. Simply put,
the adversary could always randomly choose x, y ∈ {0, 1}k, compute w = hs(x, y)
and then commit w. Upon getting a valid certificate c = (w, t, n, z) for w from
the server it could construct a valid certificate for x by appending 1 to n and y
to z so cx = (x, t, n||1, z||y) would be a valid certificate. Therefore, unless w = x,
the scheme would be ”broken”. After noting that the same trick could be used for
producing a certificate for y as well and that we can choose x 6= y we can always
backdate at least one value.
They however noted that this attack has a critical flaw - the adversary had to know
what he wanted to backdate (the x and y values) when he commited his values
to timestamping. It follows that this type of attack does not really jeopardize
the security of this scheme in practical applications. They then gave a security
condition that better describes a real-world attack scenario.
The new scenario is this: We assume that the server may coerce with the adversary
and may allow it to commit a few values ri into the repository R. The adversary
then waits for something to backdate (not knowing what it may be). Once any-
thing of that type arrives (for instance a new invention he wants to claim patent
rights to), he tries to backdate it to one of the values ri previously commited by
him. If he succeeds, the attack is considered successful.
This differs from the previous attack model mainly by that the adversary has no
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knowledge what he has to backdate when he is allowed to commit the original
values. For this, the adversary needs to be broken up into two parts - one that
finds the values to be commited and the other that tries to produce a certificate
for a value fed to it for backdating. The new security property is defined in the
following way:
Definition 1.3.3. We say that the Harber-Stornetta scheme is (t, )-secure relative
to the distribution D if for any t-time adversary A = (A1, A2)
Pr[(r, a) = A1, x← D, (n, z) = A2(x, a) : V (x, n, z) = r] <  . (1.3)
Note that the small a is just extra information that A1 passes to A2 as they are
still in essence one program.
Buldas and Saarepera then go on to show that the original scheme is secure in
that respect if it uses a collision-free hash function assuming that the structure of
the trees being constructed is restricted and verification checks whether the certifi-
cate is consistent with the tree structure. This version of timestamping is called
restricted-tree timestamping and since rather good approximations to collision-free
hash functions exist, a scheme implemented that way can be made secure.
1.4 Chain Resistance Property
The security of the unbounded case still remains a problem, however. Buldas
and Saarepera introduce a new security property for hash functions called chain
resistance for just that purpouse.
Definition 1.4.1. A hash function h : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k is (t, )-chain resistant
(relative to a distribution Dk on {0, 1}k) if for every t-time adversary A = (A1, A2)
Pr[(r, a) = A1, x← Dk, (n, z) = A2(x, a) : V (x, n, z) = r] <  . (1.4)
This essentially means that for a randomly chosen x← Dk it is hard to construct
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a chain from h that leads from x down to r. This definition is rather directly
adopted from the security condition for the Harber-Stornetta scheme. As such, it
is rather trivial to show that if hs used in the scheme is (t, )-chain resistant, then
the scheme itself is (t, )-secure.
The definition nearly repeats the security condition for the Harber-Stornetta scheme.
However, in this case, it is not a property of a scheme but rather the property of
a hash function. The main question that arises is: Do hash functions with this
property actually exist and can we construct them? The simplest way of doing this
would be proving that a certain already known security property such as collision
resistance would automatically imply chain resistance.
Buldas and Saarepera showed that no standard reductions used in cryptography
today could allow one to prove that collision resistance implies chain resistance.
They conjecture that a so-called black-box construction of a chain resistant func-
tion from a collision-resistant one may also be impossible. The topic of this thesis
is to examine that hypothesis.
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2. Cryptographic Reductions
2.1 The Construction of Merkle and Damg˚ard
To illustrate what a black-box reduction actually means, we begin this chapter
with a theorem due to Merkle [9] and Damg˚ard [5] who proved it independently.
To illustrate the reduction better, we use a somewhat simplified form of the original
construction. The reader more interested in how such constructions are used in
practice should consult a good cryptographic textbook (for instance [14]).
Theorem 2.1.1. Assume that for fixed n,m ∈ N there exists a family F1 of
collision-resistant hash functions f : {0, 1}n+m → {0, 1}m. Then for every k ∈ N
there also exist a family F2 of hash functions h : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}m that is collision-
resistant.
Proof. We start by constructing the family F2. Let f : {0, 1}n+m → {0, 1}m be
any function from F1 and let s ∈ {0, 1}m be a randomly chosen seed. We now
define a function hf,s : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}m by showing how it works on a fixed input
x ∈ {0, 1}k. The family F2 can then be defined as the set of all such functions hf,s
where f ∈ F1 and s ∈ {0, 1}m.
If n does not divide k, we begin by adding zeroes to the end of x until its length
is a multiple of n. We then break x into blocks of n bits so x = x1|x2| · · · |xl for
l = d k
n
e. After that, we construct y1, . . . , yl ∈ {0, 1}m by specifying y1 = f(s|x1)
and yi = f(yi−1|xi) for i = 2, . . . , l. The value yl is then returned as the output of
hf,s(x).
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The preceeding description of computation can easily be formalized as an algo-
rithm. It should also be easy to see that if f can be computed in t steps then
h can be computed in roughly lt + n steps so it remains relatively efficient. It is
also crucial to note that we use f in a black-box manner – we do not know how
it works, only that it does. We give it input and it gives us output, but how it
computes the output does not concern us.
We now need to show that if F1 is collision-resistant then so is F2. Assume the
opposite, eg. that F1 is indeed collision-resistant but that F2 is not. There then
exists an adversary A that can break the collision-resistance property for the func-
tions h ∈ F2 with more than a negligible probability. Assume A can find a collision
pair (a, b) for hf,s ∈ F2. Let a = a1|a2| · · · |al and b = b1| · · · |bl where both ai and
bi are all blocks of length n bits where a and b are padded with zeroes if needed.
Then the computation of h(a) yields a sequence a′1, . . . , a
′
l and the computation of
h(b) gives b′1, . . . , b
′
l. Since (a, b) is a collision, we have a
′
l = h(a) = h(b) = b
′
l. This
implies that f(a′l−1|al) = f(b′l). If a′l−1|al 6= b′l−1|bl, this gives us a collision for f . If
not, let r be the smallest such value that a′r+1 = b
′
r+1 but a
′
r|ar+1 6= b′r|br+1. This
value has to exist because (a, b) is a collision so a 6= b which implies that ar and
br differ at some point. It is also clear that it gives us a collision for f . Therefore,
we can also break f ∈ F1 by choosing a random seed s, using A to find a collision
for hf,s and use that to find one for f .
We note that we essentially constructed an adversary for F1 based on an adversary
A for F2. The construction is efficient because we essentially follow the same steps
as in the computation of h. This implies that F1 cannot be collision-resistant which
contradicts our original assumption. Therefore, F2 has to be collision resistant if
F1 is.
We note that the proof if fully constructive – we show how to construct F2 and
then show how to break F1 if we know how to break F2. This proof technique is
known as a reduction – we reduce the problem of the security of F2 to the security
of F1.
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2.2 Cryptographic Practice
Reductions of this type are one of the main tools in cryptography. The idea is to
prove the security of a complex scheme based on the security of its constituents by
showing that if there exists an adversary that breaks the complex scheme then we
can construct an adversary that breaks at least one of the constituent primitives.
Since the security of the primitive is taken as a premise, this gives a contradiction
and thus the scheme must be secure. However, since we want the scheme to work
regardless of the actual primitives being used, we cannot make any assumptions
about them other than them being efficient. This gives rise to so-called black-box
reductions – we are assumed to be presented with a method of implementing the
original primitive (the black box) and we can use it, but we have no idea on how
it is constructed.
Cryptographic reductions are similar in many ways to complexity-theoretic reduc-
tions. While cryptography studies the security of certain problems then complexity
theory is more interested in how efficiently something could be computed in theory.
It is clear that complexity theory plays a rather important role in cryptography as
well, since the notion of being easily computable is used quite often – we want the
primitives to be easily computable but the adversaries not to be so. It follows that
many cryptologists today have a rather strong background in complexity theory.
Complexity-theoretic reductions are usually used to prove that one problem is no
less hard to solve for a computer than the other. However, as complexity theory is
more interested in general limits than on specific problems, there is a large body
of theorems that show that certain types of problems cannot be reduced to certain
others via certain types of reductions. The reductions were introduced into cryp-
tology in the early eighties by Micali and it did not take long for cryptologists to
start coming up with the same types of theorems for the limits of cryptographic
reductions. For that, however, they first needed to formalize the notion of a cryp-
tographic reduction. Before introducing the formalizations, we need to introduce
some complexity-theoretic preliminaries.
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2.3 Complexity-theoretic Preliminaries
2.3.1 Algorithms in General
First of all, we need to be more general and use the notion of an algorithm not
only in the role of an adversary but also in the role of constructions. In the case of
a construction, it describes what to do in order to get from the given input to the
desired output. While it is more convenient to think of a computer running the
program in case of an adversary, this intuition works poorly for the construction
sense. The construction is better thought of as a set of instructions by which the
computer (be it a machine or human) could work. However, everything said in
the first chapter about the notion still applies – it does not matter what sort of a
formalization or an implementation we consider. All that is important is that the
instructions could be followed in a bounded time (be it bounded in the number of
steps, in actual computational time or what not), can be completed without any
creativity but with an access to a random source (a.k.a. given a certain input and
a certain sequence of random coins, the instructions always lead to the same result
with the same amount of time or steps). All these assumptions (including the fact
that we consider a random source to be available at all times which means that
the algorithms are randomized) are implicit in the following chapter.
In the first chapter we used the notion of t-time algorithm. In reality, it is more
common to speak of polynomial-time algorithms, which means that the number
of steps t allowed is bounded by a polynomial of the length of the input or by
some other specific parameter (for instance, if the input is a function, such as for
the collision-resistance adversary, we often consider the input length of the hash
function to be the parameter instead of the length of the description). The poly-
nomial can be of arbitrarily large degree and can have arbitrarily large constants,
and thus such an adversary may not be computable in practice. What we are more
interested in, however, is the fact that all the functions that can be calculated fast
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for inputs of reasonable size do work in polynomial time so if we can rule out any
polynomial time adversary, we can be rather sure no efficient adversary could exist
at all for any larger inputs.
Formally, we say f(x) = O(g(x)) (f is bounded by g) if there exist c and k0 such
that ∀x > k0 : f(x) < cg(x) and we say that f(n) is polynomial in n if f(n) = O(nc)
for some c. For further convenience we also define f(x) = ω(g(x)) to hold when
limx→∞
g(x)
f(x)
= 0. We define an adversary to be in polynomial time relative to n
if t is bounded by a polynomial of n. We also sometimes say efficient instead of
polynomial-time.
2.3.2 Oracle Machines
We also need the notion of an oracle machine. For our purposes, we say that an
algorithm A is an oracle machine with an oracle O (denoted AO) if O calculates
a function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and AO can make calls to that function that are
then calculated for him in a fixed number of steps by the oracle, regardless of how
much time the computation would actually take. Since we work in a polynomial
security model, we can directly adopt the complexity-theoretic model of an oracle
working in one timestep. The notion of an oracle machine formalizes the notion
of an algorithm with black-box access to a certain function. The oracle can be
thought of as a module, providing certain type of functionality. For instance, the
construction for h given in Theorem 2.1.1 used f as an oracle. We also note that
the oracle function may even be hard or even impossible to compute. The func-
tionality of calculating it is given to the algorithm from the outside and it does not
concern the algorithm how the value for the oracle function is found. The name
”oracle” even suggests it for an oracle is a person or a prophetic agency considered
to be a source of superhuman knowledge in the non-technical speech. Where the
oracle gets his or her knowledge is beyond the realm of reason but is usually not
questioned.
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We also describe what it means for an adversary to break a certain security prop-
erty (such as collision-resistance). Without going too much into the mathematical
formalism, we say that a primitive P is a security condition along with all the
possible functions for which the security constraint has a meaning but may or
may not hold. Collision-resistant hash function is a good example of a primitive
– the security constraint is that of collision resistance and the family of functions
is that of all the possible hash functions as it makes sense to talk about collision
resistance for all of them. We denote the set of the functions associated with the
primitive P as FP and call its elements the implementations of P . We say that the
adversary A P-breaks the implementation f ∈ FP or a family of implementations
F ⊂ FP if its success probability for breaking the security property of P for them
is greater than n−ω(1) (where again n is the parameter that is usually taken to
be the input length of either the adversary or the primitive being broken). The
reader interested in a more formal approach is encouraged to read [12].
With this mathematical machinery in place, we can define the reductions.
2.4 Possible Formalizations of Reductions
Reingold, Trevisan and Vadhan consider seven different types of reductions in [12],
starting with the most restrictive ”fully black-box” to the least restrictive ”free”
reduction. We explore only those relevant to further discussion.
2.4.1 Fully Black-box Reductions
Simply put, the notion of a fully black-box reduction captures the simplest form
of cryptographic reduction where the new primitive is constructed from the old
by using the original primitive as a black box. In this case, the adversary for
the original primitive is also constructed in a black-box fashion from the original
primitive and the adversary for the new construction. Since we formalize the notion
of a construction with a black-box access to something as an oracle machine, this
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gives us the following definition:
Definition 2.4.1. We say that there exists a fully black-box reduction from a
primitive P to primitive Q if there exist polynomial-time oracle machines G and
S such that
Correctness For every implementation f ∈ FQ we have that Gf ∈ FP .
Security For every implementation f ∈ FQ and every adversary A, if A P-breaks
Gf then SA,f Q-breaks f .
In the definition, G is the construction of a new primitive and S is the construction
of the adversary. G is allowed to use the original implementation f and S is al-
lowed to use the new adversary and the implementation f . We require both G and
S to work in polynomial time for the constructions to be efficient. That require-
ment is logical because we want the reductions to be usable in the real world and
because most primitives can be broken given infinite time, regardless of any oracles.
The Merkle-Damg˚ard construction given in the beginning of this chapter is a good
example of a fully black-box construction. In there, Q is collision-resistant hash
functions of type f : {0, 1}n+m → {0, 1}m, P is collision-resistant hash functions
of type h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m, G is the construction for h and S is the construction
for the adversary. It might be helpful to skim through the proof of Theorem 2.1.1
again to better understand how and why a reduction of this type actually works.
Since this construction is the easiest, most reductions done in cryptography are
of this type. It is however quite limiting because we require the adversary to be
constructed explicitly given the new adversary and f .
2.4.2 The two Semi Black-box Reductions
The semi black-box reduction is a lot less limiting because it no longer requires an
explicitly constructed adversary for the original primitive based on the adversary
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for the new one. All it needs is that if an adversary exists for the new scheme then
one must also exist for the original. This is formalized in the following way:
Definition 2.4.2. We say that there exists a semi black-box reduction from a
primitive P to primitive Q if there exists a polynomial-time oracle machine G
such that
Correctness For every implementation f ∈ FQ we have that Gf ∈ FP .
Security For every polynomial-time oracle machine A1 there exists a polynomial
time oracle machine A2 such that for every implementation f , if A1 P-breaks
Gf then A2 Q-breaks f .
We note that every black-box reduction is also a semi-black box-reduction: if there
exists a polynomial time adversary A, we can take A1 = A and A2 = S
A. Since
both S and A are polynomial-time, it follows that so is A2 and the implication
is proved. Semi black-box constructions are however clearly more general because
all we have to prove in this case is that an adversary to the original primitive Q
exists, which may often be done without explicitly constructing it. This definition
roughly corresponds to a non-constructive security proof where f is still black-box.
We also introduce a similar but even more general notion of ∀∃-semi black-box
reduction:
Definition 2.4.3. We say that there exists a ∀∃-semi black-box reduction from
a primitive P to primitive Q if for every f ∈ FQ there exists a polynomial-time
oracle machine G such that
Correctness Gf ∈ FP .
Security For every polynomial-time oracle machine A1 there exists a polynomial-
time oracle machine A2 such that if A
f
1 P-breaks Gf then A2 Q-breaks f .
This allows us to supply a different construction for every possible f instead of
constraining us to a ”one size fits all” variant that has to work for every single
implementation. It should again be clear that all semi black-box constructions are
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also ∀∃-semi black-box constructions. We also note that to date, reductions that
don’t fit the last pattern are nearly unheared of. Therefore, if one could prove
that no ∀∃-semi black-box reduction can exist between two primitives then that
essentially means that tools used in modern cryptology are unable to give such a
construction.
We also note that the two preceeding definitions differ a little from those given by
Reingold et al. The difference is in the fact that we can construct A2 for every A1
regardless of which f it breaks. The definitions given here better reflect common
cryptographic practice and the intuition of actual cryptographers.
2.4.3 Relativizing Reductions
As noted before, the idea of proving the nonexistence of reductions of certain type
arose from complexity theory, where the central question for 35 years has been
”P = NP?”. In 1975 Baker, Gill and Solovay used a clever trick in [1] to show that
all the possible reduction types used in complexity theory during that time could
not show that equality. The method they used became known as oracle separation
and the reductions it prevented were named relativizing reductions.
The same idea was carried over from complexity theory into cryptography by Im-
pagliazzo and Rudich in [8]. While the previous definitions of reductions formalized
our intuitive ideas about what a reduction could possibly look like, this reduction
type is more of an ingenious mathematical tool.
However, we first need to introduce the notion of a primitive existing relative to
some oracle.
Definition 2.4.4. We say that a primitive P exists relative to an oracle Π if there
exist polynomial-time oracle machines that implement P when given access to Π
and that at least one of them is secure even when an adversary has access to Π.
This essentially formalizes the case where we just add a new base operation to the
computational model we are using – besides being able to do all the normal opera-
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tions in one step, we allow both the adversaries and the function constructions to
make oracle calls to Π. As usual, we say that a primitive exists if we can implement
it. This definition allows us to define the notion of a relativizing reduction which
essentially means a reduction that holds in the presence of all possible oracles.
Definition 2.4.5. There exists a relativizing reduction from a primitive P to a
primitive Q if for every oracle Π, if Q exists relative to Π then so does P .
This definition has one clear advantage over the previous ones. Namely, it is rather
easy to prove that no relativizing reductions exist between two primitives – all we
need for that is to show that there is an oracle O such that the primitive Q exists
relative to it but that no polynomial time implementation of P is secure against
adversaries with an access to that oracle.
However, what makes this definition useful is the fact that it fits into the previous
hierarchy. Firstly, all fully black-box constructions are relativizing. To see that,
assume that there exists a black box reduction from P to Q that is not relativizing.
Then there exists such an oracle O that Q exists relative to it but P does not.
Let f ∈ FQ be an efficient and secure implementation of Q relative to O. It then
follows from the black-box reduction that there exists Gf ∈ FP for which there is
an adversary AO,f that breaks it. Then SA,f,O is an adversary for f that breaks
it, which is a contradiction since we assumed f to be secure relative to O. Since
all fully black box reductions are relativizing, we can use the oracle separation
technique to rule out the possibility of fully black box reductions. This approach
has proven quite fruitful for many different important primitives. However, Those
types of results can usually be extended. For that, we need to look a little down-
ward in the hierarchy.
We note that for all relativizing reductions we can construct an equivalent ∀∃-semi
black-box reduction. To see that, assume we have a relativizing reduction from
P to Q and consider an implementation f ∈ FQ. If f is secure against any poly-
nomial time adversary Af1 , then Q exists relative to oracle f which also implies
that P exists relative to f or that there exists a polynomial time implementation
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G = Gf (we just dont use the oracle f) of P for which no polynomial-time adver-
sary Af2 could break it.
What turns out to be more interesting, however, is the fact that in almost all
cases, the reverse implication also holds – namely, that for most ∀∃-semi black-
box reductions there also exists a relativizing one. All that is required for that is
to be able to embed any oracle into any implementation of the primitive Q so that
the implementation would still be secure and well-formed. The proof is described
in [12] and they also give the formal requirements made to the embedding. The
only problem with using their approach is that they consider only binary oracles
that have exactly two possible output values. Their approach can, however, be
extended to cover arbitrary oracles. The problem is that we cannot hope to be
able to embed any possible oracle into some primitives because their output length
is usually limited. However, since our main interest is in trying to prove the non-
existence of a reduction, we can get by with just embedding the separation oracle.
This leads to the following theorem adopted from [4] but considered as folklore
there:
Theorem 2.4.1. Assume there is an oracle O and that there is a polynomial-time
implementation f ∈ FQ secure relative to an oracle O but no polynomial time
implementation g ∈ FP is secure relative to O. Suppose further that O = pif for
a polynomial time algorithm pi. Then there exist no ∀∃-semi black-box reductions
from P to Q.
Proof. Let f be the secure and efficient implementation ofQ relative toO. Assume
that there exists a ∀∃-semi black-box reduction and let g = Gf ∈ FP be the end
result of it for f . Since, by the premises, no implementation of P is secure relative
to O, there exists an adversary AO1 that P-breaks g. Since O = pif (O can be
computed using f in polynomial time), we can convert AO1 into A
′f
1 that does
exactly the same things but uses pif instead of O. Since we have a ∀∃-semi black-
box construction, it follows that there also exists an adversary Af2 and we can
convert it back to A′O2 by noting that f has to be computable in polynomial time
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when given access to O. This however means that A′O2 Q-breaks f , which is a
contradiction since we assumed that f was secure relative to O.
We see that this theorem is quite general. All that it requires is that we are able
to embed the separating oracle into an instance of the original primitive that is
also secure with respect to that oracle. This is usually rather easy to do, since we
can set aside a negligible fraction of the inputs to be used for oracle calls and use
the rest as we would normally.
2.5 A Proof Technique With two Oracles
Hsiao and Reyzin give an alternative method of proving there are no fully black-
box reductions in [7] using two oracles instead of one. We give their result along
with a sketch of a proof:
Theorem 2.5.1. Let A and f be two oracles such that
(a) There is a polynomial-time oracle machine T f that implements Q.
(b) For all polynomial-time oracle machines P , if P f implements P then there
is a polynomial-time oracle machine DA,f that breaks P f .
(c) There is no polynomial-time oracle machine S such that SA,f breaks T f .
Then there exist no fully black-box reductions from P to Q.
We note that f can be thought of as advice for implementing Q well and A can
be thought of as the adversary part of the oracle that can be used to break P but
is useless against that one good implementation of Q.
Proof. This theorem is essentially a corollary of the original oracle separation
through relativization. CombineA and f into a single oracle (A, f). ThenQ clearly
exists relative to it since T f implements Q because of (a) and no polynomial-time
adversary breaks it with that oracle due to (c). The property (b) ensures that no
implementation of P is secure and thus the result follows.
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The importance of this theorem is more in the idea here – we are allowed to
give a good advice oracle that helps us with constructing a secure instance of
Q along with the oracle meant for breaking P . This advice oracle then ideally
allows us to prove unconditional irreducibility theorems for even the primitives we
don’t normally know how to implement well. Other than that, the theorem offers
relatively little new.
2.6 The Approach of this Thesis and Related
Work
As we have shown thus far, all that would be needed to rule out fully black-box
constructions is an oracle that could be used to break chain-resistance while leav-
ing at least one family of functions collision-resistant. Buldas and Saarepera [4]
demonstrated that no collision-resistant hash function could be proved to be chain-
resistant by fully or semi black-box reductions. The oracles they used are of little
help to us, however, since they rely on the same function being broken for both
chain and collision resistance. The article still suggests that oracle separation could
nonetheless be used to rule out the construction of a chain resistant function from a
collision resistant one. We explore that possibility by trying to construct an oracle
based on a suitable hash tree. How it is done exactly is covered in the next chapter.
We also note some other related work. Ju¨rgenson and Buldas show in [2] that
black-box constructions cannot give a collision-resistant function based on chain-
resistant functions. Their result is essentially the other direction of what we are
trying to prove. For practical considerations, Buldas and Laur prove in [3] that
the hash functions that are chain-resistant need not even be one-way.
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3. The Hash Tree Oracle and a
Pair-checking Adversary
3.1 The Construction Idea for the Separation
Oracle
As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, our approach is to try to construct
a separation oracle that could rule out constructions of chain-resistant functions
from collision resistant ones. For that we need an oracle that breaks all implemen-
tations of chain-resistance while leaving at least one family of hash functions secure
in the collision-resistance sense. The first thing we note is that chain-resistance
is quite a complex property. It is hard to think of any useful information that
the oracle could give that would help break it other than the actual root value
and certificates. There is one natural candidate for an oracle that can do that –
namely one that constructs a tree from a large amount of inputs and then returns
the root value and certificates based on that tree.
We now consider the oracle as constructing a tree from all the possible inputs
x ∈ {0, 1}n that could be sent to be timestamped. We can formalize the oracle
O = (O1,O2,O3) such that O1(H) returns the root value of that tree constructed
for the hash function H and O2(x,H) gives a certificate (n, z) for x by taking the
path from that tree starting from the input x. It is clear that such an oracle will
break every hash function in the chain-resistance sense with probability 1. Inspired
by the theorem with two oracles in the previous chapter, we also add a third part
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O3 to the oracle which would implement a truly randomly chosen function from
some well-chosen hash function family. All we would need in this case is to show
that the hash function supplied by O3 is hard to break. Due to it being computed
by the oracle the hash function that we deem unbreakable does not have to be
polynomial-time. It also means we get control over information flow in the oracle,
which is to say, the oracle knows how much info about the function leaks or would
leak to the adversary when it constructs a certain type of tree since it can observe
what oracle calls would be made in its computation.
We note that this representation for the oracle is clearly not optimal in the sense
of the lenghts of its inputs and outputs. We could modify them so that the out-
puts they currently give could be computed in polynomial time from the ones they
would give then. For instance, O2 can give out only the corresponding z1 and n1
of the certificate, as the next entry can then be constructed by computing H(x, z1)
or H(z1, x) (depending on n1) and we can call the oracle again and again until we
end up in the root. There are a few other tricks that could be used. However,
these shorter representations would only be useful if we considered embedding the
oracle into a function, which we would need for ruling out semi black-box con-
structions. This thesis is mainly concerned with fully black-box constructions and
as such leaves the possibility of an embedding as a future problem to be solved
once this oracle is indeed shown to give the desired separation.
There are, however, severe limitations on using this type of oracle. We now try to
describe what they seem to be and how they could possibly be avoided.
3.2 How not to Construct a Separation Oracle
The approach suggested in the preceeding section initially sounds very promising.
However, Buldas managed to prove (as a yet unpublished result) that if the oracle
indeed gives out the root of a full tree (a tree with all the possible inputs x) from
33
O1, such an oracle can always be exploited to find a collision. We state the result
as a theorem:
Theorem 3.2.1. Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a hash function. Then there exists a
polynomial time oracle machine construction for H : {0, 1}4n → {0, 1}2n such that
if a full tree is built from Hh, its root value r = (r1, r2), r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}n will be a
collision for h.
Proof. We show that Hh(x1, x2, y1, y2) (x1, x2, y2, y2 ∈ {0, 1}n) can be constructed
as follows:
• Check if x1 and x2 form a collision for h. If they do, return (x1, x2).
• Check if y1 and y2 form a collision for h. If they do, return (y1, y2).
• If neither condition was satisfied, return 02n.
It is clear that if a collision is ever presented to Hh as either left or right input, it
will also return a collision as output – it can be the same collision but it may also
be the collision passed as the other input. Since we are presented with a full tree,
every possible 2n-bit string is given as input somewhere. Since there is at least
one collision, a string encoding that must also be given as input from somewhere
and it follows that a collision will also nessecarily be returned as the root value
because there is a path of Hh leading from the collision down into the root.
This theorem means that an oracle that constructs the full tree can always be ex-
ploited. We note that we do not need to break the chain-resistance property with
probability one. This means that we are allowed to fail to produce a certificate for
some inputs x for O2 as long as we can produce a certificate with a non-negligible
probability. This means that the tree does not need to be full, but it still needs to
be quite large – it needs to use at least a polynomial fraction 1
p(n)
of all possible
inputs.
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3.3 Extending the Construction
The previous construction leaves some room for generalization. Suppose we check
more than one pair per each input, but still pass on our findings so if a collision is
ever found, it will propagate to the root. This leaves us with a question of what
inputs to check.
After some consideration we can formulate our question in terms of graph theory.
Suppose we are trying to construct H : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k that will find collisions
for h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. Since we are trying to mimic the previous construction,
assume that for each x ∈ {0, 1}k the function has a set of pairs in h it will check
for and if it finds a collision it will pass that same value x down. We can then
construct a bipartite graph. Let Pn be the set of unordered pairs from {0, 1}n
(so |Pn| = 2n−1(2n − 1)) and let G = ({0, 1}k, Pn, E) be the bipartite graph such
that (x, (y1, y2)) ∈ E iff H checks the pair (y1, y2) when given x as input. What
we would like is for every subset of {0, 1}k that has at least 2k
p(n)
elements to have
nearly all the elements of {0, 1}2n as its neighbours (so at least one collision would
be among the neighbours). That would mean that no matter what inputs are
given to that tree, assuming there are at least 2
k
p(n)
of them, a collision will always
be found. There is one additional constraint – namely, we can check only a poly-
nomially bounded number of pairs, as H is expected to work in polynomial time.
It turns out that just such types of graphs have been considered before in other
applications.
3.4 Disperser Graphs
Definition 3.4.1. We call a bipartite graph D = (V1, V2, E) a (K, )-disperser if
the neighbour set N(U) of every U ⊂ V1 with cardinality K has at least (1− )|V2|
elements in it.
In our case, we are looking for a K = 2
k
p(n)
disperser graph with as small  as we
can possibly have. It turns out that there are well-known lower bounds on all the
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parameters of disperser graphs.
Dispersers are mainly used as theoretical tools for randomized complexity classes
or for extracting randomness from a weak source. They are generally considered
alongside extractors, which serve a similar but stronger role. Both types of graphs
are often used in complexity theory and cryptography and there are numerous
good surveys about their properties, consntructions and bounds (see Shaltiel [13]
for one).
Let D be the average degree of a vertex in V1. One thing we have to note straight
away is that for us to have any hope of always covering enough of V2, we need
KD ≥ (1 − )|V2| since otherwise there simply are not enough neighbours. Since
most of the time some neighbours overlap, this would be an idealistic scenario.
As it turns out, there are much more strict bounds for the parameters. In fact,
Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma give the following theoretical bounds in [11]:
Theorem 3.4.1. Suppose that G = (V1, V2, E) is a (K, )-disperser with N = |V1|
and M = |V2|. Let D be the average degree of a vertex in V1.
(a) Assume that K < N and D < (1−)M
2
(so G is not trivial). if 1
M
 < 1
2
then
D ≥ 1

log N
K−1 .
(b) Assume that K ≤ N
2
and D ≤ M
4
. Then DK
M
≥ c log 1

for some c.
We try to apply these bounds to see how far the previously presented adversary
idea could take us. Let q(n) be the polynomial by which D is bounded. From (a)
we then find that q(n) ≥ c1

log(n) for some constant c and thus  ≥ c log(n)
q(n)
≥ 1
q′(n)
for some polynomial q′(n). This means that we can guarantee that all but 1
q′(n) of
all the possible pairs are covered. We now turn to study the structure of the hash
functions and their collisions to show how well this approach could work.
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3.5 The Structure of Hash Function Collisions
3.5.1 Collision Graphs
It should be clear that we can view collisions as edges in a graph with the vertex
set being the domain of the hash function. We formalize that with the following
definition:
Definition 3.5.1. Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a hash function. We call the graph
Gh = ({0, 1}n, E) a collision graph for h if (x1, x2) ∈ E precisely when x1 and x2
form a collision.
We now formally try to describe the structure of collision graphs with simple com-
binatorial arguments.
Lemma 3.5.1. Let Gh be a collision graph for h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m . Then for
every x ∈ h({0, 1}n), the vertices in h−1(x) form a clique in Gh.
Proof. Choose x1, x2 ∈ h−1(x), x1 6= x2. Then h(x1) = x = h(x2) and so they
form a collision.
We note that a single vertex without any neighbours also constitutes a clique.
The following lemma completely describes the structure of collision graphs.
Lemma 3.5.2. The collision graph Gh for h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is the union of
at most 2m vertex-disjoint cliques. Also, for any graph G of 2n vertices and the
previous property we can construct a h′ such that G is the collision graph of h′
Proof. There are at most 2m elements in h({0, 1}n). The original of each of them
forms a clique and no vertex can belong to two different originals so the cliques
have to be vertex-disjoint. The second part is obvious, as we can index the cliques
with values from {0, 1}m and then construct the h′ so that h′(x) would return the
index of the clique the vertex x is in.
37
3.5.2 Edges to Check in the Best Case
We are interested in the question of how many edges we have to check before we
can be sure there is at least one collision among them.
Lemma 3.5.3. Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a hash function. Then there is at least
one x0 ∈ {0, 1}m such that |h−1(x0)| ≥ 2n−m.
Proof. Assume that the statement does not hold. Then for all x ∈ {0, 1}m we have
that |h−1(x)| < 2n−m. But then |h−1({0, 1}m)| < 2n−m × 2m = 2n
Corollary 3.5.4. The collision graph Gh of h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m has at least one
clique of size 2n−m.
We now state a classical theorem of graph theory proved by Turan in 1941
Theorem 3.5.5. (Turan) Let G = (V,E) where |V | = n and G contains no clique
of size r + 1 or larger. Then
|E| ≤
⌊(
1− 1
r
)
n2
2
⌋
and equality can be achieved.
This allows us to prove the following:
Theorem 3.5.6. Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a hash function. Then we can
guarantee that we find a collision by checking for 2n+m cleverly chosen pairs.
Proof. By Turan theorem there exists a graph with the vertex set {0, 1}n such
that it has no cliques of size 2m but has |E| =
⌊(
1− 1
2n−m−1
)
22n
2
⌋
edges. If we
check all the pairs corresponding to edges in the complement of that graph, the
collision graph can not be formed from the remaining edges because by the previous
lemma, it has to have a clique of 2n−m vertices but no such clique can exist due to
the original graph chosen being free of them. The complement of that graph has
1
2
2n(2n − 1)− |E| < 2n+m edges so we can do it by checking 2n+m pairs.
We should note that while in general, any discrete function with domain smaller
than the range is considered a hash function, it is generally assumed that the dif-
ference n−m = ω(log(n)) because if it is smaller, then the ”secure” constructions
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are usually trivial but also hard to use in practice. We also make the same as-
sumption in our work and henceforth consider the difference n−m to be bounded
from below as mentioned.
Considering that using the disperser approach, we can cover all but a polynomial
fraction of the pairs, there is always a possibility of the set induced by the dis-
perser covering those 2n+m cleverly chosen pairs and thus finding a collision. This
means that the disperser construction cannot be ruled out by simple combinato-
rial claims, since there is a theoretical possibility of a K element subset always
covering those vertices that guarantee us a collision.
However, constructing a disperser that does that is a different story entirely. It is
known that there are dispersers with D = Θ(n

) and with log KD
M
= log log 1

+ c
and there are explicit constructions that come pretty close to these bounds (for
instance the one given in [15]), covering a certain set (or actually one of a a family
of sets as we can permute the vertices in the Turan construction) is not guaranteed
by the usual constructions.
3.5.3 Edges to Check in the Worst Case
We however note that the Turan construction is a good case – if we can choose
the pairs ourselves, we can get by with asking for just 2n+m of them. We still have
not answered the question of how many pairs we would need to check in the worst
case. The following theorem and its corollary addresses that question.
Lemma 3.5.7. Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a hash function. Then there are at
least 2n−1(2m − 1) collisions.
Proof. We know the collision graph is composed of vertex-disjoint cliques and
that a clique of size n has 1
2
n(n− 1) edges. Let ni = |h−1(i)| where i ∈ {0, 1}m so∑
i∈{0,1}m ni = 2
n. Then there are
∑
i∈{0,1}m
1
2
ni(ni − 1) = 12
(∑
i∈{0,1}m n
2
i − 2n
)
collisions and the formula is minimized when ni are chosen as equal as possi-
ble. If h maps exactly 2n−m elements to each x ∈ {0, 1}m then there are exactly
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2n−m
(
1
2
2m(2m − 1)) = 2n−1(2m − 1) collisions.
Corollary 3.5.8. Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a hash function. Then there can be
at most 2n−1(2n − 2m) pairs that do not form a collision.
We would therefore need to cover all but roughly 2−(n−m) fraction of the inputs.
Since n−m = ω(log n), this means a 1
nω(1)
) fraction and thus the disperser approach
does not get us far enough, because we leave a polynomial fraction uncovered and
this is less than what is needed.
3.6 Infeasibility of the Disperser Approach
We now take a step back and try to understand why extending the construction
fails. We note that our approach is essentially the following – check as many pairs
as you can in the tree and hope you catch one. If you do, just pass it down to the
root. Since the tree is of exponential size, the hope of finding one is quite large,
so it is a reasonable trick to try. So why doesn’t it work? Maybe the approach
of just checking pairs is too simplistic. We note that for these types of adver-
saries we can replace the oracle for h = O3 given to A with a ”collision oracle”
ch : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1} such that ch(x, y) = 1 precisely when h(x) = h(y). We now
explore the boundaries of adversaries with just that oracle.
In this case, the problem for constructing the oracle parts O1 and O2 becomes
simple. All we have to ensure is that we form the tree in such a way that we can
always answer 0 to the oracle queries presented to us within it. If we can ensure
that we answer few enough queries and we answer all of them negatively, then it
follows rather directly that collision-resistance of h = O3 is preserved. It turns out
that if we only consider the collision oracle, this problem is (nearly) equivalent to
trying to find a good enough disperser.
3.6.1 Adjusted Problem Statement
We begin with a definition:
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Definition 3.6.1. We say that Hc : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k is a Hash adversary for a
hash function family χ of h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m if it is computed by a deterministic
oracle machine that makes at most a polynomial number pH(k) of calls to the
collision oracle ch during any call H(x) where x ∈ {0, 1}2k.
We stress that we consider deterministic machines for hash adversaries. This is
only natural because we expect H to compute a function.
We now prove a somewhat suprising result showing that our problem can be re-
duced to a much simpler one.
Theorem 3.6.1. Let F be a family of hash functions h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m .
Assume that for any Hash adversary H and for all but an  fraction of h ∈ F
there exists a subset K of cardinality δ22k such that for all x ∈ K no call to ch
made by H(x) covers an actual collision for h. Then we can construct a tree with
at least δ22k inputs for any hash adversary H ′ such that no collisions are checked
during its execution. The reverse also holds.
Proof. Let H : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k be any hash adversary. We construct a full
Merkle tree of Hc0 such that every possible input x ∈ {0, 1}2k is presented to it
exactly once. We use the dummy oracle c0 that always returns 0. Based on that
tree, we define H ′(x) to do all the calculations and calls to the oracle c done by
Hc0 on the path from H(x) down to the root. Since H makes at most a polyno-
mial number of calls to the oracle and the path is of length k, H ′ is also a hash
adversary. We can therefore extract a δ22k cardinality subset K for which H ′ will
not ask for any actual collision of h from c (for all but an  fraction of h ∈ F).
We construct the hash tree for H as the union of all the paths in the Merkle tree
that begin from vertices in K. Since no collisions are found on these paths due
to the construction of the set K, these paths are the same as those in the original
Merkle tree constructed with the dummy oracle c0. This means that their union
indeed forms a proper tree and since no path finds a collision, the tree constructed
as their union also fails to find one.
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The reverse is actually trivial: Let H : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k be a Hash adversary and
assume that for some h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m we can find a tree with at least δ22k
different inputs and during which no collisions are found. If we just take the set
of inputs given to it, we have the required subset of cardinality K for H.
This theorem essentially says that instead of trying to construct a tree, we should
concentrate all our efforts to just finding the subset of input pairs with the re-
quired size and property, because once we can do that for any hash adversary, we
can also construct the tree. This removes one dimension of complexity from our
problem and allows us to look at it in terms of graph problems yet again. The
proof was carried out for full inputs of length 2k but if we can construct a tree
from a polynomial fraction of them, it is bound to contain a polynomial fraction
of different single inputs of length k as well.
3.6.2 Infeasibility Results
We know from before that the disperser graphs fail to give us such a construction
(at least with simplistic attempts). It turns out that a probabilistic argument
shows that we cannot do much better with other means either:
Theorem 3.6.2. Assume that H : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k is a hash adversary with an
oracle ch for h where h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is chosen uniformly from a family of
hash functions F . We also assume that for every pair (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}2n, x 6= y the
probability that c(x, y) = 1 is 2−ω(log(n)). Then the probability of not being able to
construct a tree that doesn’t show any collisions is negligible.
Proof. Let N(x1, x2) be the number of different inputs of H on which it checks for
the collision c(x1, x2). It is clear that
∑
(x,y)∈{0,1}4n N(x, y) ≤ p(n)22k since there
are a total of 22k different possible inputs and for each input the number of calls
to ch is bounded by a polynomial p(n). We calculate the expected value of the
number of inputs Np that will lead to a collision being detected in their branch:
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E[Np] ≤
∑
h∈F
Pr[h]
∑
(x,y)∈Pn
N(x, y)[h(x) = h(y)] =
=
∑
(x,y)∈Pn
N(x, y)
∑
h∈F
Pr[h][h(x) = h(y)] =
=
∑
(x,y)∈Pn
N(x, y)2−ω(log(n)) ≤ p(n)22k−ω(log(n)) .
Where [·] is the Iverson symbol (that is 1 when the predicate within the brackets
is true and 0 otherwise) and Pn is the set of unordered pairs from {0, 1}n.
Using the Markov inequality we get that Pr[Np ≥ 22k−1] ≤ p(n)21−ω(log(n)) so a
subtree with at least half of all the different inputs fed to it that fails to find a
collision can be found for all but a p(n)21−ω(log(n)) fraction of h. Using the previous
theorem now gives us the promised result with δ = 1
2
.
What this theorem roughly means is that given any fixed hash adversary, the oracle
can avoid revealing the collisions to it directly. It does not, however, rule out that
from such trees we could somehow deduce the collisions indirectly. We can extend
the construction given in the previous theorem to rule out that as well:
Theorem 3.6.3. Under the assumptions of the previous theorem, the probability
of finding a collision can be made negligibly small.
Proof. Let 2−d be the collision probability in the previous proof. For each h ∈ F
we randomly chose a set Fh ⊂ F of size 20.5d and try to avoid all of their collisions
instead of just those for h itself. The probability of randomly choosing a collision
for one of them from the set of all the possible pairs is 2−d · 20.5d = 2−0.5d and if
d = ω(log n) then so is 0.5d. This means that the argumentation of the theorem
will still go through and that we can still avoid the set of forbidden pairs for all
but a superpolynomial fraction of h ∈ F . This however also means that each
such avoiding tree could be valid for any of the 20.5d possible hash functions in
F instead of just one and considering the construction and size of that set, the
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average chance of guessing a collision correctly only knowing the set Fh that h
belongs to it is still negligible.
This means that an adversary that only uses the approach of checking pairs of
input values for collisions can always be fooled. As such, it rules out one rather
simplistic approach for the adversary trying to exploit the oracle. We now turn to
see if our approach could be extended or improved in any way.
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4. Other Possible Approaches
By now we have shown that it is hard to exploit the tree oracle by just checking
pairs for collisions. However, there are more complicated things that the adversary
could do. We now rule out a few other seemingly promising approaches.
4.1 The Equality Oracle
We note that there is a lexicographic and a rather natural total ordering of bit-
strings that corresponds to the order of natural numbers if the strings are inter-
preted as numbers in base 2. One of the first ideas about finding collisions that
Buldas originally had (also an unpublished result) was to construct a hash ad-
versary that could find the maximum and minimum input that produced a given
output when the full hash tree was used. All that was essentially needed for that
were checks in the form h(x) = y, x ∈ {0, 1}n, y ∈ {0, 1}m. If we formalize that
in the form of an oracle eh(x, y), the same argument as presented for the collision
oracle can be carried out nearly word to word to show that this approach has as
little potential as our previous one, since as before, we can nearly always find trees
that always answer 0 to the query. In this case the lack of potential does not follow
as easily though. We note that it would take 2m− 1 queries of this type that were
answered negatively to determine the value h(x). Therefore there is a possibility
of the adversary still finding out the value of h(x) during the tree. However, the
argument given for ch in theorem 3.6.3 that looked at collisions for a large set of
randomly chosen h′ ∈ F instead of a single h could again be used rather effectively
to rule out the equality oracle giving enough useful information.
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4.2 The Greater-than Oracle
The approach of finding the minimum or maximum of some values gives us another
idea of what to try to rule out. Suppose we base our construction ofH on questions
of the form h(x) > h(y) where the order is the same natural lexicographic order
as mentioned before. In that case we can also construct a binary oracle g(x, y) to
answer queries of this type. There is one very important difference between this
oracle and the previous two considered. In the collision and equality oracles, the
answers were clearly asymmetric in the amount of information they gave away.
That meant that 0 was a ”safe” answer and if we could avoid ever answering 1,
that nearly guaranteed that the oracle could not be exploited. In this case, both
answers 0 and 1 give out nearly equal information so always answering 0 is just as
dangerous as always answering 1.
This means that we have to recheck all our steps for the collision oracle. We note
that theorem 3.6.1 essentially relies on our ability to ”fake” safe answers so we
could get a static tree structure. As we remember from the theorem 3.2.1, if we
honestly answer the queries in the full tree then the adversary can guarantee him-
self a collision in the root. We also note that the greater-than oracle can be used
to emulate the collision oracle as c(x, y) = 1 happens exactly when g(x, y) = 0 and
g(y, x) = 0. This means that to use the same technique, we have to find a way
to fake the oracle answers consistently enough that a ”correct” subtree where all
the answers were correct could be extracted but yet falsely enough that the root
would not give the adversary a collision. This is by no means a trivial task.
There is however a way to do so. We extend h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m into a larger
range to get h′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+n such that the most significant bits of h′(x)
correspond to the output of h(x) but the least significant ones are chosen randomly
with a constraint that h′ is injective so no output corresponds to two different in-
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puts. We then answer g(x, y) queries based on h′ instead of h. Clearly, we have
to clean the tree of all the answers that say g(x, y) when h(x) = h(y) but this is
essentially the same as clearing the tree of all the queries where c(x, y) would be
equal to 1.
However a small problem remains. Namely, the argument used to prove that the
answers given by the oracle do not uniquely determine the collisions by some indi-
rect means does not work as it did before. The original idea needs to be modified
a little. Instead of choosing random hash functions into Fh, we choose the other
hash functions in such a way that consistent answers can still be given rather easily
for the greater than. To be precise, we try to avoid answering queries such that
h(x) and h(y) differ only in the last 0.5d bits where 2−d is the collision probabil-
ity. Essentially the same argumentation as before could then be used. Intuiton
behind this approach is that instead of h we simply consider a hash function
h′′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m−0.5d for which we elliminate the collisions in the tree. Since
we remove any oracle queries that distinguish between collisions within a class of
size 20.5d output values, it is easy but rather technical to prove that even knowing
all the information given out by the oracle the chance of finding a collision is still
negligible.
4.3 Greater-than-by-value Oracle
We note that there is one more natural binary oracle we could try to fake: the one
for queries of type h(x) > y. This oracle has one strength over the others: while
it would take 2m − 1 queries to know the actual value of h(x) using the equality
oracle and even more for the others, it only takes roughly m queries to find the
value using this one. This means that we could easily interchange between a binary
oracle of this type and a full oracle for h since we can compute one from the other
in polynomial time. Therefore, if we could learn to somehow fake this oracle in
the same sense as we have faked the three previous ones, it would give us a full
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proof of the separation we have been seeking. It should then be no suprise that
this oracle seems to be much harder to fake and we have not discovered a good
means of doing so. The approach used for greater than does not work because if
each H tries to query an exact value of h(x), it can get it with m queries and there
is no legal way to prevent that.
4.4 Using many Oracles in one Construction
We note that we can also rule out all the constructions that use a combination
of the first tree oracles∗ – the last step in theorem 3.6.2 can be changed to use
δ = 4
5
. Then we can choose the sets separately for all three such that none of
them gives enough information and then take their union which is of size at least
a fraction δ′ = 1
5
. This can be done even after the tricks used in theorem 3.6.3 and
its analogues have been taken into account. Therefore, this thesis rules out any
adversary constructions that work based only on these three oracles and do not
use any additional types of info. This seems to rule out most of the simple ways
of exploiting the oracle, so if the tree oracle does not work, the adversary that can
use it to break collision-resistance for O3 has to be fairly clever.
4.5 Possible other Constructions of Oracles
The work presented up to now leaves the possibility of oracle separation in a rather
ambiguous state – the proposed oracle seems to be hard to exploit, but it seems
to be nearly impossible to rule out an adversary construction that nonetheless
does so. There is one more approach that could lead to some positive results. We
note that for any possible function presented to the oracle, the probability of it
giving any information about the collisions of h supplied by the oracle taken over
all the possible inputs nearly always has to be negligible – if it is not, we could
do without an oracle by simply choosing a random input, using the function on
it and trying to deduce a collision based on that. We essentially proved this fact
∗Of course, if we note that the collision oracle can be emulated with the greater-than oracle,
we can only get by with two oracles and the argument would be somewhat simpler
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for collision checking adversaries in theorem 3.6.2 and then extended it to other
oracle types. This approach might be slightly more general in allowing for more
complex hash adversaries but it leaves a problem of constructing a tree, since the
approach we took in this thesis does not work any more or has to be heavily mod-
ified at the very least. It thus seems that the problem needs more complicated
mathematical machinery, perhaps that of information theory and of Kolmogorov
complexity but perhaps also of advanced complexity and combinatorial theory.
However, there may be a better choice for an oracle that could lead to a easier
separation. We now briefly discuss a few possible alterations to the current scheme.
We first note that the oracle has to be a well-defined function. It can, however, be
highly dependent on its inputs. For instance we may vary the polynomial fraction
of inputs we give out based on the working time of the function given as input.
This may allow us to better limit the number of possible inputs seen. However,
this will probably not help much.
There are certain inherent flaws in the oracle model we have been studying. The
major one is that it can force us to give out exponential amounts of information
during the whole calculation of the tree. This causes us theoretical problems be-
cause there is no way to rule out an exponential amount of it being transmitted
through the root value since a polynomial output may carry information about
an exponential sized set. This makes it nearly impossible to rule out many oracle
calls eventually helping to find a collision. There may be ways of showing that
any information about an exponential sized set that the root gives could not be
reliable or that it could not be gathered at all. However, the current model seems
to present no obvious ways of doing it.
The tree model is good if we want to avoid showing collisons for the function the
tree is constructed from. However, we only have to avoid showing collisions for
just one function – the one provided by O3. This means that we might want to
abandon the tree approach and instead just concentrate on certificates that do
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not have to form a tree when viewed together. This removes one rather restrict-
ing constraint, but does not really solve any problems, since there seem to be no
obvious good ways of constructing a root value without avoiding the problem of
possibly exponential information.
There seems to be one way that clearly solves the problem with O1 giving too
much info – namely, choosing it randomly. The best way to do that for a given
H : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}k is to uniformly generate a k element long hash chain string
with uniformly chosen inputs its root value. It can, in fact, be shown that if
the root value is chosen that way, a certificate exists for most inputs with rather
high probability. Also, in this case, we clearly need not worry about too much
information leaking from O1. However, there may be problems with unwanted
information leaks from O2 since the path structure of the certificates may then
reveal information that is hard to control. Because of that this model seems to be
much harder to analyze than the one we mainly studied.
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Conclusion
We tried to show that no black-box constructions could exist that would give a hash
function secure for time-stamping from a hash-function that is collision-resistant.
For that we studied an oracle that constructs a large hash tree, gives out its root
value and then outputs certificates according to the tree structure. Since breaking
the time-stamping property requires the tree to be of exponential size, it is hard
to avoid giving the adversary the capacity of performing exponential amounts of
work within that tree.
We manage to show that this oracle does not seem to be easy to exploit for find-
ing collisions. It is known from before that if a full tree is constructed inside the
oracle then it can be used to break collision-resistance for all hash functions. We
try to extend the construction used to find collisions in that proof and conclude
that the simplistic approach of just checking pairs of inputs for collisions is not
enough to find a collision with just one oracle call. We then rule out a few other
simple approaches. Namely we prove that only checking if the hash function gives
a certain output for a given input and checking if one input gives a larger hash
value than the other will also be insufficient, even when used together in the hash
adversary.
We also briefly discuss ways of altering the oracle that may make the proofs easier
in some respects. However, we conclude that the model currently used seems to
be the easiest to study and that while the other models eliminate some theoretical
problems, they give rise to other and more complicated ones.
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Kollisioonivabadel ra¨sifunktsioonidel
po˜hinevate piiranguteta
ajatempliskeemide
vo˜imalikkusest
Magistrito¨o¨ (20 AP)
Margus Niitsoo
Ka¨esolevas to¨o¨s uurime piiranguteta ajatempliskeemi jaoks turvaliste ra¨sifunkt-
sioonide konstrueerimise vo˜imalusi kollisioonivabadest ra¨sifunktsioonidest. Kasu-
tades Harberi ja Stornetta poolt loodud ajatembeldusskeemi ning Buldase ja
Saarepera poolt selle jaoks konstrueeritud turvatingimust uurime nn. musta kas-
ti konstruktsioonide vo˜imatuse to˜estuse vo˜imalikkust. Kuna vo˜imatuse to˜estuse
lihtsaim variant on oraakliga eraldus, keskendumegi just u¨he selle eralduse jaoks
sobivana tunduva oraakli omaduste ja vo˜imaluste uurimisele.
Me eeldame, et oraakel konstrueerib ra¨sipuu, va¨ljastab puu juurva¨a¨rtuse ning
annab seeja¨rel sellest puust la¨htuvalt ajatemplisertifikaate. Me to˜estame, et kui
oraakli argumendiks olev musta kasti meetodil koostatud ra¨sifunktsioon ainult alg-
se ra¨sifunktsiooni kollisioonipaare kontrollib vo˜i nn. suurem-kui predikaati kasutab,
ei saa seda oraaklit kasutada kollisioonide leidmiseks . To¨o¨ tulemused annavad loo-
tust, et nimetatud oraakel on to˜epoolest eralduseks sobiv ja lubavad oletada, et
sarnaste oraaklite edasine uurimine vo˜ib lo˜puks probleemi lahenduseni viia.
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